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There has been a lot of works on corruption cases. We must think that corruption 
is a cultural aspect in a social life. We cannot separate the corruption with the 
cultural system where the corruption raised. Indonesia has been recorded to be 
one of the countries of the worst economic and political system on corruption 
case. The paper is introducing the usage of agent based simulation for analyzing 
the corruption specifically in Indonesia as the biggest corruption level. The model 
showed is named money-scape, inspiring by the way of corrupt bureaucracy in 
Indonesia. The paper showed how the situation taken by the revolutionary 
strategies combating corruption and some peaceful and smart strategies 
generically.  
 




…corruption …undermines good government, 
fundamentally distorts public policy, 
leads to the misallocation of resources, 
harms the private sector and private sector development, 
and particularly hurts the poor... 
-Mission Statement of Transparency International- 
 




Indonesia has been recorded to be one of the countries of the worst 
economic and political system on corruption case (in the rank 97
th with 1.7 point 
on the scale of CPI score (Transparency International, 1999). There has been a 
lot papers about the corruption as the bad mark of the macro-economical system. 
Nonetheless, the paper will discuss somehow on the cases of corruption met in 
Indonesia most. The different cultural system will somehow regarding to the 
specific cases, consequently the corruption cases in Indonesia will be somehow 
different. The paper will discuss about the corruption cases most occurs in 
Indonesia regarding the characteristics and specific cultural system where they 
grew.   2 
The paper will begin with some literatures and researches about the paper 
on the contemporary cases on corruption around the world. The next section will 
discuss about some unique cultural situation output the corruption in Indonesia 
social system and the need for the social analysis on the cases, how to make 
some changes for the better social system and bureaucracies. The next section is 
the model built as the primary part of the paper, and how the results of the 
simulations. Some further works for the better accomplishment and better 
implemental ideas will be noted in the last section within some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Review on Literatures about Corruption 
There has been a lot of works on case corruption. Norris (2000) examines 
the interactions between self-interested agents in a two-tier government 
hierarchy, consisting of a central authority and bureaucrats in a two-stage game, 
where the actions of agents affect private sector allocations. In advance, Norris 
show in the language of game theory how the corruption regarding the utility 
function of bureaucrats regarding the monitoring process and the dictatorship 
happens in a governmental state. 
Gupta, Mello, and Sharan (2000) examine the association between the 
higher military spending with the corruption. The work discovered the evidence 
indicating that defense spending can be considered for constructing governance 
indicators. Another relevant work is authored by Abed and Davoodi (2000) 
showed the adverse impact of corruption on economic performance. It was found 
that the corruption is largely the symptom of deeper insights into economic 
performance.  
Nonetheless, we can find many cases of corruption (or bribery) across the 
countries. It is apparent that the corruption becomes an inherent factor regarding 
the bureaucracies even though in the modern countries with modern 
governmental infrastructure. But eventually, we must acknowledge that the cases 
on corruption are mostly occurred becoming the social disease in the social 
system of the developing and under-developing countries. As well as in 
Indonesia, lots of people said that the primary cause of the corruption is the low 
wages of the civil servants. However, it can be showed apparently about the 
negative relationship between corruption and wages, especially in the developing 
countries (Rijckeghem & Weder, 1997). The work of  Leite and Weidmann (1999) 
shows another more plausible ideas on the level of corruption across the 
countries. Corruption is mostly happens on the natural resources abundance 
creating the opportunities for rent-seeking behavior, by which becoming the 
important factor determining the corruption level of a country. 
However, the literature described above offers general approaches on 
cases of corruption. However, it is hard analyze the cases of corruption realizing 
the cultural values and the social living of a country. Some works on the top-
down approach shall be completed by the bottom-up analysis, and however, the 
works on the artificial society shall give some important perspectives for the 
improvement of our understanding on corruption spatially and temporally (Axtell, 
2000, Situngkir, 2003b).  
Some works on corruption in bottom-up analysis are somehow existing on 
the approaching into the cognitive system on how someone can be corrupt. The 
work of Hammond (2000) introduced the agent-based studies on corruption and 
gave some important notes on the corruption generally; especially in the 
transition of endogenous factors of the corrupt agents. This was done by 
combining the game-theoretic decision rules of agents and the spatial and 
discrete modeling on micro-view of corruption and bribery. Furthermore, the 
analysis constructing the dynamical behavior of corruption is also available, 
introduced by Chakrabarti (2001). In this work, it is apparent the connection of 
macro-economical analysis on corruption and the micro-state factors in agent-
based simulations.    3 
Nevertheless, we must think that corruption is a cultural aspect in a social 
life. We cannot separate the corruption with the cultural system where the 
corruption raised. In Indonesia, the corruption is a very annoying factor for the 
reconstruction of the national politics and economics after the regime of New-
Order. This is an important issues that has been long time for the nations to 
struggle with and made the nation become retarded in the development of supra-
structure of the society. The rest of the paper will model the generic situational 
aspects of the society regarding the corrupt bureaucracies.  
 
3. Building The Model:  The Money-Scape 
We will start from the definition that shall we make of the terminology of 
corruption. However, it is rather hard to determine whether one action is a 
corruption or not. We will make this succinct on the remarking of the properties 
of the corruption terminology. There are at least three factors becoming the 
primary properties of corruption, i.e.: 
1.  Corruption must have benefit economically for the agent that corrupting.  
2.  Corruption must have the bad impacts macro-economically. The corruption 
itself is the micro-state of the economical system, but it must have bad 
impact to the economical growth in macro-view, whether big or small. 
3.  Corruption must have socio-legal consequences to the corrupt agent.  
By the three definitions we will build the model we can make to analyze the usual 
corruption in Indonesia. 
  The model we use in the paper regards to the bureaucracies exploiting the 
economical positions. We will have the money-scape distributed normally in the 
landscape where the agents to be placed on. It will be rather different with the 
model built in the several previous papers since we will analyze the exploitation of 
the economical positions of the money-scape and see the micro-view 
perspectives. The bureaucrats (as agents) are placed in every cell. We assume 
that all of the agents are in the same political and economical positions. In this 
case, we can see our system model as regional peer-to-peer governmental 
system in Indonesia, whether the regional governments are in the same positions 
but facing the different economical potential to be exploited for the people. 
  However, there will be some difference in the properties of the exploiting 
agents, i.e.: the level of honesty (distributed randomly among agents) with the 
value between 0 and 1. The value [0,1], representing how honest the agents are. 
The honesty level of 1 is the most dishonest and the 0 is the most honest. The 
honesty level will be constant throughout the game.  
The other primary property of the agents is the risk-aversion level. This 
level is also distributed as the initial condition randomly. The value is [0,1]. The 
level of risk aversion 0 is the most averse and the 1 is the irrationally corrupting 
in the danger and big risks. In the simulation, the level of risk aversion will be 
changed over time. We will use the Von-Neumann neighborhood (4 neighbors: 
up-down-left-right, no diagonal influences). This will represent the limited social 
networks among the agents, concerning the regional state of Indonesia separated 
by many obstacles as an archipelago. The jailed corrupting agents in her social 
networks will mostly influence the level of risk aversion. The more the neighbors 
to be in jailed the more the risk aversion level. 
The agents are placed on the money-scape, and the agents will exploit the 
money in her spatial environment/cell. Whether they use the political and 
economical power to produce what the people wants in their cells will mostly 
depend upon the level of honest and risk aversion. Figure 1 showed how the 
agents distributed, while the cell (with gradating color represents the poor or rich 
cells; the more black the cell the more the cell to be poor and vice versa). 
In the model, we assume that the whole agents tend to corrupt, as a 
realistic representation of Indonesia bureaucrats getting out of the dictator 
Soeharto regime.  



















The exploitation process every round of iteration will be in the simple equation: 
Y = E(1-X) 
Where Y is representing the output of the process whether the regional/spatial 
cell is better economically or not. The E is representing the initial condition before 
the cell exploited, and X is the corruption factor. The bigger the corruption factors 
the worse the economical level of the cells.  
  The X factor is however depends upon the level of honesty and risk 
aversion of the agents. X=h.r, where h is representing the honesty level and r is 
the risk aversion. It is obvious that when the agent is fully honest, or fully afraid 
of the socio-legal factors, the corruption level will be turned to zero. Apparently, 
we can see that the maximum or best output of the cell system in every round 
turns out to be the same with the previous state. 
The risk aversion level (r), will be changed all over the rounds. It will 
strongly influenced by the social network, whether or not there are jailed agents 
in her neighborhood. The more the jailed agents the smaller the value of risk 
aversion. In this model, we use the r=exp(-n), as n represents the number of 
jailed agent surrounding.  
In macro-view, we find computationally: the number of jailed corrupter, 
the money left after each round of iteration, the total money stolen by each 
agents, and the evolution of corruption index. The corruption index will be shown 












where the K is the total population built the matrix cells. The index i is 
representing the agent and j representing the round of iteration.  
  The law-enforcement process will hold jail after seize the corrupt agent 
and the agent will have no idea about how he can be taken. The random process 
throughout the whole cells represents the process of the law-enforcement. One 
important note that shall be added is that the simulation was done in the toroidal 
scape, henceforth the edge of one side will be continued by the opposition side, 
respectively. Eventually, the money-scape will be “grown”, as the economical 
value of each cell is increasing. This is consistent to the fact of some economical 
activities possible although in high-level corrupting society. By the increasing of 
the economic value, the risk aversion will be reset to some values respect to the 





The splash-screen of the money-scape. The darker is the poorer. The red 
cells represent the jailed bureaucrats.    5 
4. Simulation Results 
B y  t h e  m o d e l ,  w e  w i l l  d o  s o m e  e x p e r i m e n t  o n  h o w  t h e  c o r r u p t i o n  
emergent is and how the process of moral force (inner the agent) versus the 
process of the law-enforcement. Thus, the law-enforcement process will be 
represented by the probability of corrupt agent to be caught. 
Using the high probability of the jailed agent (0.1) does the first experiment. We 
use 80 rounds of iterations with 35x35 matrix, and the result is showed by the 
figure 2. . It is apparent that by using the constant law-enforcement the stolen 
resources will be oscillated in some certain value. Henceforth the strategy of the 
constant law-enforcement somehow made the corruption is taken away but 











































We can easily compare the situation with the low constant law-enforcement 
(about 0.0000001). By using the constant law-enforcement the stolen resources 
will be oscillated but diverged.  The lower the law-enforcement the worse the 
level of stolen resources by the regional political power 
Figure 2 
The simulation result with high constant law-enforcement. The jailed agents are represented in the left 
figure and the graph of the total money stolen by the whole agents in the right side. It is apparent that by 
using the constant law-enforcement the stolen resources will be oscillated in some certain value. 
Henceforth the strategy of the constant law-enforcement somehow made the corruption is taken away 
but cannot be totally gained as the oscillated the stolen money by un-jailed agents. 
Figure 3 
The simulation result with low constant law-enforcement. The jailed agents are represented in the 
left figure and the graph of the total money stolen by the whole agents in the right side. It is apparent 
that by using the constant law-enforcement the stolen resources will be oscillated but diverged.  The  
lower the law-enforcement, the worse the level of stolen resources by the regional political power.   6 
  The second experiment is modeled the revolutionary forces of combating 
the corruption. We run this simulation by making a linear increasing of the law-
enforcement by multiplying the factors of the number of jailed agents in the 
previous round. The jailed agents are hiking fast and the corruption index is 



















The last experiment we can use by the model is by making the central 
government to be smarter using the law-enforcement. The law enforcement is 
obviously taking a lot of money to spend. In our experiment we will use how the 
government use the law enforcement economically but effective. Making the 
learning system to comprehend and evaluate the estimated loses money and the 
number of the previous jailed agents and appropriating the evaluation with the 
level of law-enforcement to be taken is the best strategy combating the 
























5. Further Works 
The simulation created here is apparently lack of data. It should be 
acknowledged that there are probably too far assumption made. However, it is 
Figure 4 
The revolutionary model of the corruption combat. The jailed agents are hiking fast and the corruption index 
is decreasing fast too. 
Figure 5 
The wiser method of using the level of law-enforcement. In this experiment the level of law enforcement is 
evaluating the number of the jailed agents and the stolen money. This is made by simple function such as 
(corruption_index(t-1) + (stolen_money(t-1)/(stolen_money(t-2) as a function for the level of law 
enforcement. By this function there is a big number of jailed agents and the low decreasing linearly the total 
money stolen by the corruption.   7 
not degrading the value of the results as the generic model. In advanced, the 
more qualitative and quantitative data on constructing the decision rule will much 
improve the simulation. Some other simulation for further advancement is the 
usage of the game theoretic decision rule in some specific cases leading to 
corruption. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Corruption is an inevitable and inherent way of the life of the modern 
bureaucracy. The moral force or altruistic social norm is a good way for 
combating the corruption, as the honesty is also the primary significant aspect of 
the corrupting actions. But however the way of moral force is hardly to be 
accepted as the only way for combating the corruption. The law enforcement in 
general is the only rational and efficient way combating the corruption. In order 
to gain the efficacy of the usage of the badly high-price law-enforcement some 
learning law-enforcement strategies should be applied.  
In some cases, revolutionary way of combating the corruption is sounding. 
Even though it is not the only way, the revolution for combating corruption is 
good enough and effective. Formally, the revolutionary way is the way of the 
brute (linearly or non-linearly increasing law-enforcement) to seize all the corrupt 
bureaucrats.  
The data and survey based researches on constructing the simulation is 
apparently can gain the researcher possibility to forecasting some aspects around 
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